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After the disastrous BATF raid on the home of the Branch Davidians, as the FBI settled
into their long siege and the world's news organizations created a small village outside
the perimeter, scholars of religion--with near unanimity--shook their collective heads in
disbelief at the strategies being adopted by federal law enforcement. Did they not know
that a group was more likely to rally behind its charismatic leader than to surrender to
his enemies? Did they not know that apocalyptic beliefs should be taken seriously, that
they were playing the role of the enemies of Christ? Did they not know that any course
of action that did not seem to come from the Bible would be unacceptable to these
students of Scripture? Did they really believe they were dealing with hostages? I have
yet to encounter a single sociologist or religious studies scholar who has the slightest
doubt that the strategies adopted by the FBI were destined for tragic failure. 1
So the question arises, how could the FBI proceed with a strategy of increasing
psychological and tactical pressure, if there was such a large body of expert opinion
that would have advised against such a strategy? That is the primary question with
which I undertook advising the Justice and Treasury Departments on future dealings
with "persons whose motivations and thought processes are unconventional" (the
language of our charge from Deputy Attorney General Philip Heymann and Assistant
Secretary of the Treasury Ron Noble). During the summer of 1993, after the tragic end
of the siege in Waco, officials in both Justice and Treasury had concluded that mistakes
had been made, that the situation was not one that could be dealt with like a normal
"hostage/barricade" situation, and that such "unconventional thinking" was likely to
present itself to federal law enforcement again. They decided they needed advice.
But they still did not know who to call. Through their usual "old boy" networks (which
evidently needed to include at least one girl), a group was assembled and designated
the "behavioral science experts." We were to be "non-compensated temporary
government employees" until such time as we had each delivered a report to the deputy
attorney general. Each of us had some experience in studying religious persons and
groups that might be called by many in "main-stream" America unconventional, but
none of us came from the well-recognized group of scholars who specialize in new
religious movements. Professor Lawrence Sullivan, of Harvard Divinity School, had
studied millennial movements in Brazil. Professor Alan Stone of Harvard Law School
and Professor Robert Cancro of NYU Medical School had both studied and written on
the intersection of law, psychiatry, and religion. And I had conducted research on fun-
damentalists, including those in the Southern Baptist Convention. I decided that one of
my basic goals would be to introduce federal law enforcement officials to relevant
scholars and scholarly literature.
The data-gathering for this project began with oral briefings conducted at the Justice
Department by the investigative teams Justice and Treasury had put in place to find out
what happened in Waco, and continued with group interviews with the people in charge
of negotiations and tactical strategy in Waco. A second round of briefings, at the
Treasury Department and at the FBI Training Academy at Quantico, introduced the
behavioral science experts to the people behind the scenes for BATF and the FBI,
respectively. In addition, I had access to a number of other sources. I was supplied with
a list of the experts consulted by the FBI during the affair. I also spoke with Glenn
Hilburn, professor of religion at Baylot [who was one of those experts), and I made a
second trip to Quantico to talk with agents Pete Sinerick and Gregg McCrary at the FBI
Academy.
During our first round of briefings, especially in our conversations with the hostage
negotiators who had been involved in Waco, the most striking finding was the FBI's
near total dismissal of the religious beliefs of the Branch Davidians. For these men,
David Koresh was a sociopath, and his followers were hostages. Religion was a
convenient cover for Koresh's desire to control his followers and monopolize all the
rewards for himself. They saw no reason to try to understand his religious beliefs,
indeed thought them so bizarre as to be incomprehensible by normal people.2  The
negotiators expressed deep regret at this state of affairs, but could see no alternatives
to the way they had come to understand the situation. The tactical commanders had no
real regret, seeing the final outcome as unavoidable.
Why Religion Was Ignored
In those conversations, and in subsequent ones, four reasons for this dismissal of
religion can be seen.  First, for at least some of those involved, religion is itself a foreign
category. They have little experience with religion themselves, and they do not really
understand how anyone could believe in a reality not readily provable by empirical
means. They are what Max Weber would call “religiously unmusical" (in Weber 1946,
25). The level of religious unmusicality in this case is evident in the investigative and
evaluative reports compiled by the Justice Department's own staff. A small, but telling
example: throughout those reports, the last book in the Bible is incorrectly identified as
“Revelations" (rather than the book of Revelation).  People in positions of public service
have perhaps come to believe that religion is not a part of the culture about which they
have any need to be conversant, whether or not they themselves are believers.
Sullivan's report to the Justice and Treasury Departments concentrates very effectively
on this aspect of the problem. At least for a significant segment of those involved in
Waco, the “culture of disbelief" (Carter 1993) was a tragic fact.
Within the law enforcement community, this skepticism about religion has a particular
flavor. Given a history of encounters with manipulative conversions of convenience,
many officers are inclined to dismiss the validity of religion as an independent variable.
When criminal "gets religion” that person is still - to their minds - fundamentally a
criminal. This reason for dismissing religion's impact is closely related to a second
factor at work in the federal officials whom I observed.3  At least some of those officials
had significant religious upbringing, but now reject that past as benighted. They were
not ignorant of religion or of its power to shape a way of life.  They simply did not think
that any rational person would choose to be religious. At best, they had a "live and let
live" attitude about religion. Their history did not make them tone-deaf so much as it
made them unsympathetic.
Still a third group of agents was thoroughly attuned to the power of religion. As people
of deep faith themselves, they knew that beliefs mattered· However, the depth of their
own faith sometimes made it difficult for them to identify with someone whose faith was
so different.  Because Koresh practiced many things their faith forbade, they could only
see his group as heretical or perhaps as a “cult."  They could not see the functional
similarities between their own experience and the experiences of the Branch Davidians.
Fourth, overlapping all the other causes for law enforcement’s failure to understand the
religious dynamics of the Branch Davidian standoff, everyone involved fell victim to the
images inherent in the label "cult.” ·Others have addressed this problem in more detail
elsewhe       re (see Lewis, this volume). Here it will suffice to note that when religious
categories were invoked at all, they were categories derived from the definitions of cult
leadership and behavior promulgated by the news media over the last two decades. A
"cult leader," according to these images, can be easily seen as a sociopath, and
"brainwashed,, members can be defined as hostages. By defining a "destructive cult"
as a group with an egomaniacal leader and ego-deficient followers, one need not attend
closely to the particular religious beliefs and practices of the group.  All that matters is
the psychological control being exercised by the leader over unwitting followers.
For the four reasons I have suggested, those directing the federal law enforcement
effort in Waco were unable or unwilling to see that they should take seriously the
religious nature of the social system they had entered. But they were also blinded by
the structures of own agencies and their own standard operating procedures.
Why Good Advice Was Ignored
In the months that led up to the February 28 attempted "dynamic entry" at the Branch
Davidians' home, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms {BATF) apparently
failed to solicit any social science background information about the nature of the group
with which they were dealing.
4  BATF has no internal behavioral science division and
did not consult with any other behavioral science persons within the government. Nor
did they consult with outside persons in religious studies, sociology of religion, or
psychology of religion. There were, for instance, persons in the Baylor University
Department of Religion who had studied this particular group for much of its history;
they were not consulted. The agency viewed this operation exclusively through strategic
and political lenses, with no attempt to ascertain why this group had guns, what they
might want to do with them, and how the larger citizenry might be assured that no harm
would result from the weapons that had been purchased. In that atmosphere, I believe,
it became easy to lose sight of the human dynamics of the group involved, to plan as if
the group were indeed a military target. It also discouraged the BATF from seeking
other forms of intervention in the group. Quite simply, the agency pursued the line of
action--armed assault--for which they were best equipped (and that not very well, as it
turned out). If they had been better equipped to pursue interventions based on human
science advice, they might have acted differently.
In their attempt to build a case against the Branch Davidians, the BATF concentrated
on informants who could presumably provide the strategic information they needed to
plan their assault. They interviewed persons who were former members of the group
and at least one person, Rick Ross, who had "deprogrammed" a group member.  Ross
has been quoted as saying that he was consulted by the BATE and their records
include accounts of multiple interviews with him. He supplied them, according to BATF
records, with "all information he had regarding the Branch Davidian cult," including the
name of a former member whom he believed would have important strategic
information. At the same time, he and Cult Awareness Network affiliates seem to have
been among the sources for the series of stories run by the Waco newspaper,
beginning February 27.  At the very least, Ross and any former members he was
associated with should have been seen as questionable sources of information, but no
such caution seems to have been present in BATF dealings with him. Having no access
to information from the larger social science community, BATF had no way to put in
perspective what they heard from angry former members and an eager deprogrammer.
Unlike the BATE the Federal Bureau of Investigation did have an extensive system of
internal and external expertise on which to call. After the failed raid, handling of the
crisis passed to the FBI.  Although they had a much broader array of information
available, they still failed to consult a single person who might be recognized by the
social science community as an expert on the Branch Davidians or on other new,
marginal, or apocalyptic religious movements.  The official list of outside experts
consulted, compiled by the investigative team, includes three persons in the field of
psychiatry who have been regular consultants to the FBI on other cases (Murray Myron,
Syracuse University, a member of the Cult Awareness Network; Joseph Krofcheck,
Yarrow Associates; and Park Dietz, University of California-Los Angeles).  From my
conversations with the persons in the National Center for the Analysis of Violent Crime
(NCAVC) who worked with the negotiators at Waco, I believe that these three persons
were the most frequently consulted experts throughout the siege. Dietz assisted in
writing the profile of Koresh. Others apparently assisted in recommending strategies to
the negotiators and tacticians.
It is unclear which of these consultants (if any) recommended the psychological warfare
tactics (Tibetan chants, sounds of rabbits dying, rock music, floodlights, helicopters
hovering, etc.). None of the persons associated with NCAVC with whom I have talked
claims to have favored these tactics, but no one was willing to say who recommended
them or how the decision was made to use them.
Three other persons were apparently called in for specific, limited consultations.
Because he was examining the children who were leaving the ranch, Bruce Perry, a
Baylor Medical School psychiatrist, was consulted. A pastor in Virginia (Douglas
Kittredge) was consulted on one occasion, offering assistance in interpreting the
scriptural references being used by Koresh. And CBN talk show host Craig Smith was
consulted regarding the airing of the Koresh tape. With the possible exception of Perry,
these persons clearly had no effect on the strategy in Waco. Kittredge was evidently the
pastor of the church attended by one of the agents, and Craig Smith happened into the
drama when Koresh wanted his teachings to receive a wide and sympathetic hearing.
On the official list of outside experts consulted, one person in religious studies is listed -
Glenn Hilburn, chair of the Religion department at Baylor. He was contacted about one
week after the initial raid and was asked especially for help in interpreting Koresh's
ideas about the seven seals. He offered the negotiators basic tools for interpreting
scripture (a set of commentaries and concordances) and consulted with them on a
number of occasions about various biblical interpretations. While Hilburn is a reputable
scholar in church history, he would never claim to be an expert on the Davidians or on
other marginal religious movements. He often offered to help the FBI get in touch with
others who might offer such expertise, but he was not asked to do so. For instance,
Professor Bill Pitts, also of the Baylor faculty, had studied the history of the Davidians,
but was not consulted by the FBI. Nor did they seek Hilburn's help in locating others,
outside the Baylor faculty, who might help.
In my judgment, the FBI's list of outside consultants is sorely wanting. The psychiatrists
who were most intimately involved are undoubtedly experienced in helping the FBI
understand "the criminal mind." This however, was a very different situation, and we
have no evidence that any of these men had background or experience in dealing with
a high-commitment religious group. Both of the psychiatrists who later offered reports to
Justice and Treasury - Cancro and Stone - were highly critical of the assessments and
strategies that resulted from failing to take the religious and social situation into
account. The only experts in religion who were consulted lacked the kinds of expertise
necessary for understanding the dynamics of an ostracized religious movement. They
tended to be religious leaders who had developed their own views on the meaning of
the Bible, but had little comparative perspective with which to offer insight.
In addition to the experts sought out by the FBI, many others were eager to offer their
help, and one of the problems faced by the Waco negotiators was that of assessing the
potential helpfulness of such outside experts. Agents on the scene in Waco described
their situation as "information overload."  One person referred to the threat of "fax
meltdown." Not only were they receiving constant information about the situation as it
unfolded, they were also being bombarded with offers of help from all sorts of unknown
sources. Many of these and were judged to be crackpots.  Others were probably
legitimate and potentially helpful persons.  However, the persons on the scene had no
way to evaluate this information.  With no one in the scholarly community at their
disposal to help evaluate the credentials and experience of these persons, their impulse
was to discount everything they received.  Over the course of the siege, agents on the
scene received communication from several persons who claimed biblical expertise and
urged the negotiators to take Koresh's beliefs seriously. In all cases, it appears, the
information was taken down, passed along, and ignored. For instance, the logs from
March 17 make clear that agents on the scene did not take seriously the possibility that
Philip Arnold’s broadcast discussion of biblical prophecy might be useful to their
negotiations.5  They evidently recognized that Arnold is a reputable scholar, but had
apparently not talked with him or listened to the broadcast themselves.
Some of the theologians who got through to Waco were of doubtful credentials, but
they were uniform in their suggestions that successful negotiations would require
meeting Koresh on his own biblical ground. Talking about the Bible, however, was
proving frustrating to the negotiators. In the log of March 15, negotiators reported that
they would start being "more firm with the group - no more Bible babble."
Although the negotiators were apparently discounting the efforts of theologians, biblical
scholars, and others, they were still listening to Rick Ross. The FBI's interview
transcripts document that Ross was, in fact, closely involved with the BATF and the
FBI. He talked with the FBI both in early March and in late March.  He apparently had
the most extensive access to both agencies of any person on the "cult expert" list and
was listened to more attentively. The BATF interviewed the persons he directed them to
and evidently used information from those interviews in planning their February 28 raid.
In late March, Ross recommended that agents attempt to humiliate Koresh, hoping to
drive a wedge between him and his followers. While Ross's suggestions may not have
been followed to the letter, FBI agents apparently believed that their attempts to
embarrass Koresh (talking about his inconsistencies, lack of education, failures as a
prophet, and the like) would produce the kind of internal dissension Ross predicted.
Because Ross had been successful in using such tactics on isolated and beleaguered
members during & programming, he must have assumed that they would work en
masse. Any student of group psychology could have dispelled that misapprehension.
But the FBI was evidently listening more closely to these deprogramming- related
strategies than to the counsel of scholars who might have explained the dynamics of a
group under siege.
The FBI interview report includes the note that Ross "has a personal hatred for all
religious cults" and would willingly aid law enforcement in an attempt to "destroy a cult."
Significantly, the FBI report does not include any mention of the numerous legal
challenges to the tactics employed by Ross in extricating members from the groups he
hates.6 Both the seriousness with which agents treated Ross and the lack of
seriousness with which they treated various religion scholars and theologians
demonstrate again the inability of agents on the scene to make informed judgments
about the information to which they had access and their inability to seek out better
information.  It also demonstrates the preference given to anticult psychological tactics
over strategies that would meet the group on grounds that took faith seriously.
While all this advice was coming in from the outside, the FBI was also relying on its own
internal Behavioral Science Unit. The Behavioral Science Services Unit, especially its
Investigative Support Unit, at the NCAVC, houses a number of people with
considerable working knowledge of marginal religious groups. For instance, Gregg
McCrary, in the Criminal Investigative Analysis sub-unit, is well informed in this area
and was on the scene in Waco throughout much of the siege. While no one there would
be considered an expert by the usual standards of scholarship (academic credentials
and publication, that is); several have done sufficient reading to have a good basic
knowledge of the nature of religious groups. They know that religious beliefs have to be
taken seriously, and they know that it takes more than understanding an individual
personality to understand the dynamics of a group. They could benefit from additional
training and from access to reliable outside experts, but they had the basic social
science knowledge they needed to analyze this situation.
In the early days of the siege, Pete Sinerick, along with outside consultant Park Dietz,
put together a profile of David Koresh and of the group. They used materials gathered
by the BATF but knew they should weigh carefully the reports from former members.
Based on that assessment, Smerick (with Special Agent Mark Young) wrote on March
5, in a memo to his superiors (the Special Agents in Charge, or SACs, at Waco and
people in headquarters in Washington),
For years he [Koresh] has been brainwashing his followers for this battle
[between his church and his enemies], and on February 28, 1993, his prophesy
came true. As of March 5, 1993, Koresh is still able to convince his followers
that the end is near and, as he predicted, their enemies will surround them and
kill them. In traditional hostage situations, a strategy which has been successful
has been negotiations coupled with ever increasing tactical presence. In this
situation, however, it is believed this strategy, if carried to excess, could
eventually be counterproductive and could result in loss of life. Every time his
followers sense movement of tactical personnel, Koresh validates his prophetic
warnings that an attack is forthcoming and they are going to have to defend
themselves. According to his teachings, if they die defending their faith, they will
be saved.
On March 7, Sinerick and Young listed the psychological warfare tactics available to the
FBI, but cautioned that these options "would also succeed in shutting down negotiations
and convince Koresh and his followers that the end is near."
On March 8, the same pair cautioned that the Mr. Carmel compound was for the
Davidians sacred ground, something they were likely to defend against the intrusions of
people they considered evil (the federal government). Summarizing the arguments of
people using primarily criminal or psychological categories to explain Koresh, they
wrote,
It has been speculated that Koresh's religious beliefs are nothing more
than a con, in order to get power, money, women, etc., and that a strong
show of force (tanks, APC's, weapons, etc.) will crumble that resolve,
causing him to surrender. In fact, the opposite very well may also occur,
whereby the presence of that show of force will draw David Koresh and
his followers closer together in the “bunker mentality,” and they would
rather die than surrender.
They go on to detail the way in which FBI actions were playing into the prophetic
scheme of Koresh, warning that "we may unintentionally make his prophesy [death, or
the "fourth seal"] come true, if we take what he perceives to be hostile or aggressive
action." They note that "mass suicide ordered by Koresh cannot be discounted." Then,
following their logic through to its conclusion, they point out that "one way to take
control away from him is to do the opposite of what he is expecting.  Instead of moving
towards him, we consider moving back. This may appear to be appeasement to his
wishes, but in reality, it is taking power away from him. He has told his followers that an
attack is imminent, and this will show them that he was wrong."
It is my belief that this understanding of Koresh's ideas was basically accurate and that
their assessment of his likely behavior was on target. While outside experts might have
refined this picture and added nuance to the assessment, the basic direction of the
FBI's own behavioral analysts was sound.
Clearly the advice of these agents was not heeded.  Why? The answer to that question
takes us first to the structure of command and second to the culture and training of the
FBI itself.  Most basically, people representing the Behavioral Sciences Unit were
outranked and outnumbered.  Within the command structure, people from the Hostage
Rescue Team carried more weight than people who were negotiators. In addition, it is
evident that people from the tactical side were simply trusted more and were more at
home with the SACs in Waco.
As I understand it, the SACs for this operation were chosen on the basis of proximity,
not on the basis of any special training or experience for an operation like this.
Understandably, their primary skills are in the apprehension of criminals and in the
management of personnel. Under normal circumstances, they can count on key
assistance in apprehension of criminals from their SWAT teams and from Hostage
Rescue Teams (HRTs), and predictably they listened most closely to people who spoke
the language of forceful tactics. This was the territory in which they were most
comfortable, possibly the direction in which they perceived the most potential rewards.
There was an understandable desire among many agents in Waco to make Koresh and
the Davidians pay for the harm they had caused. Arguments for patience or
unconventional tactics fell on deaf ears.7
Those ears were deaf for a number of reasons, many of which have to do with the
training and culture of the FBI. In all likelihood, these SACs had had no behavioral
science training since their very early training as agents.  nd then, they were very
unlikely to have heard anything about religious belief systems or group dynamics. Their
entire professional world has been constructed (understandably) around
comprehending and outmaneuvering criminals. They think (again, understandably) in
terms of individual behavior (hence the near exclusive focus on Koresh, rather than on
the group) and on criminal wrongdoing (hence the label "sociopath" for someone seen
as dangerously at odds with society's norms).  Little, if anything, in their previous
experience prepared them for the kind of situation Mt. Carmel presented them.
The tendency to discount the influence of religious beliefs and to evaluate situations
largely in terms of a leader's individual criminal or psychological motives is, I believe,
very widespread in the FBI.  In our initial briefings with negotiators and tacticians, the
consensus around the table was that when they encountered people with religious
beliefs, those beliefs were usually a convenient cover for criminal activity.  While they
were willing to consider that this case might have been different, they were still not
convinced that Koresh was anything other than a sociopath who had duped some
people into helping him carry out aggressive criminal activity. They continued to refer to
the members of the group as hostages, failing to recognize the free choice those
people had made in following Koresh.
Behavioral science advice, then, failed to get an adequate hearing. In the culture of the
law enforcement community, neither training nor experience prepares agents for taking
behavioral scientists seriously. And in the crisis situation, behavioral scientists are out-
ranked and out-numbered.  As a result, those in charge approached this situation as if it
were one more familiar to them - a criminal committing illegal acts for personal gain for
whom the threat of force is a significant deterrent.
What Can Be Done?
To alter that basic pattern of action and response, a number of changes in law
enforcement practice are essential. In my report to the Justice and Treasury
Departments, I recommended the following.
1. Basic training. The training for all agents should include units in the behavioral
sciences and units that give attention to the nature of political and religious groups.
These units should emphasize both the rights of such groups to exist unhindered and
the characteristics of high-commitment groups that may be relevant to future efforts at
law enforcement. Such units should be aimed not so much at making every agent an
expert as at sensitizing agents to the complex human dimensions of the situations in
which they may find themselves. When they hear behavioral scientists advising them
later, it will not be the first time they have heard such voices in the law enforcement
community.
2. Advanced training. Incidents like Waco are, fortunately, relatively rare.  Not
everyone in federal law enforcement needs to be an expert on such situations.
However, it appears that there is a need for a standing group of specialists in managing
this sort of crisis. Rather than turning to whomever happens to be the local SAC, the
FBI (and similar federal agencies) should have a small corps of crisis managers
available. These persons should have received advanced training both in the various
tactical measures at their disposal and in the insights available to them from the
behavioral sciences.
3. Training and expertise for other federal agencies. An expanded Behavioral
Sciences Unit, perhaps not lodged in a single agency, might make a broader pool of
behavioral science information available on a regular basis to all federal law
enforcement agencies. I was particularly struck by the fact that BATF has no such unit.
No one ever had the responsibility of imagining what the people at Mt. Carmel were
like, or how they might be thinking. With dozens of federal law enforcement agencies, it
would not be cost-effective to set up behavioral science units in each one, but such
expertise should be available to all of them.
4. A broader pool of experts who can be consulted. Not all sorts of expertise are
needed all the time. But agencies should not be caught in a moment of crisis wondering
who to call and how to assess the credentials of those who call them. It is essential that
behavioral scientists inside federal law enforcement and behavioral scientists in the
academic community forge expanded working ties.  People in law enforcement have for
too long distrusted the "ivory tower" position of academics who do not have to make
"real world" decisions. They have too long insisted that only someone who is really an
insider to law enforcement can give them advice. For their part, academics have for too
long discounted the experience and wisdom of persons working in law enforcement
because it did not come in standard academic packages. It is my sense that this
incident provides an opportune moment for overcoming both those problems. Law
enforcement people are more aware than ever of the need for additional insight and
training, and academics are more aware of their obligation to the public.
That new cooperation might take a number of forms. The various training facilities for
federal law enforcement might host a series of consultations in which a small group of
academics and a small group of agents work together for two or three days on
problems and potential problems facing law enforcement. Academics, for their part,
might organize sessions at annual professional meetings at which such questions are
raised and to which law enforcement people are invited. In addition, people teaching in
the various academies should be encouraged to read more widely and to draw in
outside experts for both routine and specialized training whenever possible. Such
ongoing collaboration would have the benefit of acquainting the two communities with
each other so that each would be better prepared for cooperation in a time of crisis.
Most concretely, it is essential that federal law enforcement develop an expanded list of
experts on whom it can call. These people need not be on contract. They simply need
to be people the agencies already know to be legitimate, reliable, and willing to
cooperate with them. The sorts of activities I am suggesting above would aid in the
development of such a list.  In addition, the various professional associations - the
American Sociological Association, the American Psychological Association, the
American Psychiatric Association - could also be helpful.  It is essential that persons in
federal law enforcement use this occasion to think proactively about the kinds of
situations they are likely to encounter in the future and to seek out now the expertise
they will need in confronting groups who may have broken the law not for personal gain,
but out of ideological and religious conviction.
The siege in Waco provided dramatic and tragic proof both that religion remains a
potent motivating force for many in American society and that most of those who serve
as the watchdogs and interpreters of American society have little ability to understand
the religious forces they encounter.  The explanations offered by anticult groups
comport well with this culture of disbelief.  They offer us "psychological disturbance”
and "brainwashing” to account for the life paths of committed believers whose practices
put them at odds with materialist, secular pursuits. But those explanations neither made
sense of the actions of the Branch Davidians nor provided sound guidance to federal
law enforcement.  It is time for the rest of the social science community to abandon its
silence and to be heard at least as loudly and often as are the voices of the "experts"
who have gained their expertise by seeking to destroy the groups they purport to
understand.
Notes
1. It is interesting to note that the four behavioral science experts asked to review
the Waco affair arrived at similar conclusions.  Although we had never worked together
before and came from very different backgrounds, we were unanimous in our
assessment that FBI strategies had been misguided.
2. I was sufficiently influenced by this widespread assessment of Koresh as
incomprehensible that I was surprised when I first began to listen to and read his
teachings.  They are but a variant on what could be found in many fundamentalist and
millennialist churches. The methods of study and exegesis he used would be familiar to
many conservative students of the Bible, even if they would disagree with his particular
interpretations.  The assessment of these beliefs as "incomprehensible” reflects both
the biblical ignorance of many public officials and news reporters and the power of the
term "cult" to render all other attempts at understanding unnecessary.
3. This assessment of the reasons for law enforcement's dismissal of religious
motives is based on conversations with the principals involved in Waco, as well as with
people involved in training law enforcement persons at the FBI Academy at Quantico.
4. Much of the remainder of this essay is based closely on the report I wrote for the
Justice and Treasury Departments.
5. Indeed the efforts by Arnold and James Tabor represented probably the best
hope for a peaceful end to the siege. By working within Koresh's biblical system, they
had suggested to him an alternative reading of critical passages in the book of
Revelation.  By this reading, Koresh should have written or recorded his explanation of
the seven seals.  The prophesied destruction of the true believers would not have taken
place, in this reading, for a long time.  The Davidians would have been free to leave
their settlement and deal with the government to resolve their differences. Koresh
evidently took this teaching and began his interpretive writing. In his last letter, written
the week before the fiery end, he stated that he intended to come out when it was
complete. The FBI, however, did not take this scenario seriously or believe that Koresh
would actually write the document (see Tabor 1994, this volume”).
6. Ross was recently under indictment in the state of Washington for the kidnapping
of a young man whose membership in a United Pentecostal Church had become
worrisome to the young man's mother. Since the victim was legally an adult, his forcible
removal from the church earned Ross the kidnapping charge. Minors can sometimes be
legally removed, at the behest of their parents, but even this tactic has become less
defensible in the courts (see Bromley and Robbins 1992).
7. Editor's note: Pete Smerick, who retired immediately after Waco, later stated
publicly that "bureau officials pressured him into changing his advice on how to resolve
the situation without bloodshed" (Washington Times, May 1, 1995). Smerick said that
he had advised a cautious, non-confrontational approach to Koresh in four memos
written for senior FBI officials between March 3 and 8. But he was "pressured from
above" when writing the fifth memo on March 9. "As a result, that memo contained
subtle changes in tone and emphasis that amounted to an endorsement of a more
aggressive approach against the Branch Davidians."
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